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Counting the Ways of Becoming a Primary Victim: 
Anderson v Christian Salvesen Plc
A. INTRODUCTION
The law on recovery in negligence for psychiatric injury where the pursuer has not 
suffered any physical injury but has witnessed the death or injury of another has been 
described as “confusing and arbitrary”,1 a “panoply of artifi cial rules”,2 “irrational and 
unsympathetic”,3 and “the area where the silliest rules now exist and where criticism 
is almost universal”.4 In fact, it is diffi cult to think of another branch of delict that has 
been subject to such extensive condemnation.
It is into this arena that the recent Outer House case of Anderson v Christian 
Salvesen5 enters. In Anderson, the pursuer claimed to have suffered psychiatric injury 
after involuntarily causing the death of a fellow employee. He suffered no physical 
injury, nor was he in any danger of doing so. In order to understand the signifi cance 
of the case, a brief examination of the history of liability for this type of psychiatric 
injury is necessary.
B. BACKGROUND
The starting point for the modern law is Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire.6 
The case was the fi rst of two House of Lords decisions that stemmed from events 
at the Hillsborough disaster. Alcock involved claims against the police, who allowed 
football supporters to enter an already over-crowded caged area, by relatives and 
friends who witnessed or heard about the deaths of their loved ones. None of the 
claims was successful. In the course of his judgment, Lord Oliver made a distinction 
between primary and secondary victims of psychiatric injury, the fi rst time this had 
been done explicitly in the case law. Primary victims were those who suffered psychi-
atric injury after being directly involved (although not actually injured) in the incident 
in question. The exact defi nition of a primary victim is the central issue in Anderson 
and is considered shortly. At this point it is suffi cient to note that the claims of primary 
victims are not subject to any special restrictions and, as long as the psychiatric illness 
in question is a “recognised psychiatric illness”,7 they merely have to satisfy the normal 
rules of reasonable foreseeability of injury in order to recover.
Secondary victims, on the other hand – those who suffer psychiatric injury after 
1 M J M Bogie, “The shocking future: liability for negligently infl icted psychiatric illness in Scotland” 1997 
JR 39 at 52.
2 F McManus and E Russell, Delict: A Comprehensive Guide to the Law (1998) 81.
3 T Weir, An Introduction to Tort Law, 2nd edn (2006) 50.
4 J Stapleton, “In restraint of tort”, in P B H Birks (ed), The Frontiers of Liability, vol 2 (1994) 83 at 95.
5 [2006] CSOH 101, 2006 SLT 815.
6 [1992] 1 AC 310.
7 As opposed to mere grief or mental suffering: see e.g. White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 
2 AC 455 at 491 per Lord Steyn.
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witnessing the death or injury of others – have to satisfy a number of additional control 
mechanisms which were fi rst set out in the earlier House of Lords case of McLoughlin 
v O’Brian,8 but which were developed in Alcock and have come to be known as the 
Alcock requirements. Essentially the pursuer must have had a close tie of love and 
affection with the dead or injured person9 and he or she must also have been present 
at the accident or its immediate aftermath.10 Because of the restrictive nature of these 
requirements, it is clearly advantageous to a pursuer to avoid being classifi ed as a 
secondary victim and therefore the precise distinction between primary and secondary 
victims is of considerable importance. In Alcock, Lord Oliver defi ned a primary victim 
variously as someone who was “directly involved in the accident”, “involved, either 
mediately or immediately, as a participant”, and “personally involved in the incident 
out of which the action arises”.11 He contrasted this to a secondary victim, who “was 
no more than the passive and unwilling witness of injury caused to others”.12 Lord 
Oliver proceeded to give three examples of plaintiffs he would consider to be primary 
victims: those who feared for their own safety,13 rescuers14 and those who were an 
“involuntary cause” of the death or injury of another.15
Page v Smith,16 the next case to come before the House of Lords, took a rather 
different approach. Here, Lord Lloyd defi ned a primary victim as one who is 
“directly involved in the accident, and well within the range of foreseeable physical 
injury”, contrasting this to a secondary victim who is “in the position of a spectator or 
bystander”.17 This is a signifi cant restriction of Lord Oliver’s defi nition in Alcock. It is 
relatively easy to envisage cases where a pursuer is “directly involved in the accident” 
(which would, presumably, satisfy Lord Oliver’s requirements) but is not in any physical 
danger and does not perceive himself to be in any physical danger.
It was this more restrictive defi nition that was approved in the most recent House 
of Lords authority, White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire.18 This case involved 
the claims of police offi cers who were on duty at Hillsborough and who assisted with 
the rescue effort. The plaintiffs were clearly going to face diffi culties in recovering 
through the secondary victim route, given that they had no close ties of love and affec-
tion with those who were killed. It was vital to the success of their case, therefore, to 
bring themselves within the defi nition of a primary victim. They attempted to do so in 
two ways: by virtue of being rescuers and by virtue of their employment relationship 
8 [1983] 1 AC 410.
9 There is a rebuttable presumption that close ties exist between parents/children and spouses (see 
McLoughlin at 422 per Lord Wilberforce; Alcock at 403 per Lord Ackner). Others have to prove that a 
close tie exists.
10 McLoughlin at 422 per Lord Wilberforce; Alcock at 404 per Lord Ackner. 
11 At 407-408.
12 At 407. 
13 At 407.
14 At 408. The possibility of rescuers being placed in the class of primary victims solely by virtue of assisting 
at the scene of a disaster was subsequently ruled out in White at 455.
15 At 408. This category is discussed in more detail later in the context of Anderson.
16 [1996] AC 155. 
17 At 184, emphasis added.
18 [1999] 2 AC 455.
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with the defendant. Both routes failed.19 In rejecting their claim, Lord Steyn clearly 
regarded Page v Smith as having narrowed the defi nition of a primary victim:20
Lord Lloyd [in Page v Smith] said that a plaintiff who had been within the range of foresee-
able injury was a primary victim ... In my view it follows that all other victims, who suffer 
pure psychiatric harm, are secondary victims and must satisfy the control mechanisms laid 
down in the Alcock case.
Of the other speeches in White, Lord Griffi ths wrote on similar lines to Lord Steyn 
(although he dissented on the question of rescuers), distinguishing between “primary 
victims, that is victims who are imperilled or reasonably believe themselves to be 
imperilled by the defendant’s negligence”, and “secondary victims … that is those 
who are bystanders”.21 Lord Hoffmann mentioned the distinction between primary 
and secondary victims only in passing and Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed with the 
reasoning of both Lord Steyn and Lord Hoffmann. Only Lord Goff of Chieveley 
(who dissented both on the issue of rescuers and on the issue of the employment 
relationship) did not regard Lord Lloyd’s defi nition of primary victims in Page v Smith 
as authoritative, stating that the passage in Lord Lloyd’s speech “should be read as 
merely descriptive of the position of the plaintiff in Page v Smith” and not as having 
the effect that “primary victims can only recover if they are within the area of foresee-
able physical danger”.22
C. THE SCOTTISH CASES
Since White, a number of Outer House decisions in Scotland have addressed the 
issue of how a primary victim should be defi ned. Two of these – Campbell v North 
Lanarkshire Council23 and Keen v Tayside Contracts24 – adopted the White/Page v 
Smith defi nition of someone who was within the range of foreseeable physical injury 
or reasonably believed himself to be so.25
This might well have been the end of the story if it had not been for Salter v UB 
Frozen and Chilled Foods Ltd.26 Here, the pursuer suffered psychiatric injury after 
he was involved in an incident – for which he was not to blame – that killed a fellow 
employee. Gordon Reid QC, sitting as a temporary judge, concluded that the pursuer 
was a primary victim, despite the fact that he was not within the range of foreseeable 
physical injury and did not fear for his own safety. Instead of adopting the White 
defi nition, which would have resulted in the pursuer’s claim being ruled out, Tempo-
rary Judge Reid relied upon the defi nition of a primary victim from Lord Oliver’s 
19 For a more detailed account of the reasoning in White, see S Todd, “Psychiatric injury and rescuers” 
(1999) 115 LQR 345; O Segal and J M Williams, “Psychiatric injury, policy and the House of Lords” 
[1999] Journal of Personal Injury Litigation 102.
20 White at 496-497.
21 At 464.
22 At 480.
23 2000 SCLR 373.
24 2003 SLT 500.
25 Campbell at 384 per Lord Reed and Keen at para 57 per Lady Paton.
26 2004 SC 233. 
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speech in Alcock, stating that:27
In my opinion, on the assumed facts, the pursuer is a primary victim because he was actively 
involved in the accident which led to the death of his fellow employee.
The decision in Salter caused one commentator to suggest that “textbooks may have to 
be rewritten”28 and meant that, at the time when Anderson came to be decided, there 
was some uncertainty in Scots law about the approach the courts should be taking to 
the primary/secondary victim distinction.
D. THE PRESENT CASE: ANDERSON v CHRISTIAN SALVESEN PLC
In Anderson v Christian Salvesen plc,29 the pursuer, a lorry driver, claimed damages 
from his employer after the truck he was driving was involved in an incident in which 
one of his colleagues died. He was in no danger himself from the incident, nor was it 
his fault, but he claimed to have suffered psychiatric injury as a result. He was always 
going to struggle to recover if he was classifi ed as a secondary victim as it is unlikely 
that he would have met the “close ties of love and affection” requirement – and it 
appears from the report of the case that he did not attempt to claim a close tie of love 
and affection with the deceased.30 Thus the key issue in the case was whether the 
pursuer could be classifi ed as a primary victim.
Lord Drummond Young was of the opinion that he could and allowed the case to go 
to proof. The basis upon which he did so is worthy of some comment. The fi rst point 
to note is that Lord Drummond Young uses the relatively restrictive defi nition of a 
primary victim from White in preference to Lord Oliver’s more expansive defi nition 
in Alcock. Lord Drummond Young states that: 31
In such cases, the test that has been adopted is … that psychiatric injury will form a head of 
recoverable loss provided that the pursuer has been placed in danger, or an apprehension of 
danger, as a result of the incident in question.
In doing so, he follows Campbell and Keen, although no reference is made to these 
cases in Anderson. Oddly, the only one of the recent Scottish cases to be cited in 
Anderson is Salter, but no reference is made to the way in which Temporary Judge 
Reid defi ned primary victims in Salter, the case being cited in a different context.32
Under Lord Drummond Young’s defi nition of a primary victim, it is unlikely that 
the pursuer in Anderson would be able to recover as there was no evidence that he 
was in physical danger or perceived himself to be so. Lord Drummond Young accepts 
this but moves on to state that the pursuer may nonetheless be able to recover if he 
has been “instrumental in another person’s death, or possibly serious injury, and that 
27 At para 27, emphasis added.
28 D Kinloch, “Salter v UB Frozen and Chilled Foods Ltd” 2003 SLT (News) 261 at 261.
29 [2006] CSOH 101, 2006 SLT 815.
30 Anderson at para 3.
31 Para 8.
32 That of the pursuer who suffers psychiatric injury after thinking that he has caused death or injury to 
another – see the discussion below.
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has caused him psychiatric harm”.33 It is on this basis that the case was allowed to 
proceed to proof.34
In reaching this conclusion, Lord Drummond Young relies in part on Lord Oliver 
in Alcock, who, as we have already seen, did regard instances where the plaintiff was 
“the involuntary cause of another’s death or injury” as cases where primary victim 
status might be conferred.35 Lord Drummond Young also relies on Salter, describing 
this as “[t]he last reported decision dealing with this category of loss”.36
The trouble with this is that it is not at all clear that the “involuntary cause” route 
to primary victim status is an accepted one. In Alcock, Lord Oliver relied on three 
cases in reaching his conclusion: Dooley v Cammell Laird & Co Ltd,37 Galt v British 
Railways Board,38 and Wigg v British Railways Board.39 These do all seem to be cases 
in which a plaintiff was allowed to recover for psychiatric injury after thinking that he 
had caused (or was about to cause) death or injury. However, the plaintiff’s fear that he 
had killed a passenger on the train he was driving was not the reason for the decision 
in Wigg, which, insofar as it is possible to tell from the brief case report, was decided 
on the basis that the plaintiff was a rescuer. Galt is reported so briefl y that little can be 
gleaned about the basis for the decision but there is no mention of the plaintiff’s fear 
that he had killed two men on a railway line as being a signifi cant factor.
Dooley does appear to have been decided on the basis that it is reasonably foresee-
able that someone who fears he has caused injury to his fellow workmen might himself 
suffer psychiatric injury,40 but as it is a fi rst instance decision from before even the 
House of Lords case of McLoughlin, it is of limited value as an authority.
Lord Oliver’s analysis of Dooley, Galt and Wigg was described by Lord Hoffmann in 
White as “an ex post facto rationalisation of the three English cases” that “owes nothing 
to the actual reasoning (so far as we have it) in any of the cases”.41 Lord Hoffmann does 
not rule out treating such cases as exempt from the Alcock control mechanisms, stating 
that “there may be grounds”42 for doing so, but at best he can only really be said to have 
left the question open, given that this was not a point that arose on the facts in White. 
This certainly seems to be the conclusion reached by leading English texts on tort.43 In 
Anderson, Lord Drummond Young did recognise the limits of Alcock as an authority 
but went on to point to Salter as a Scottish case where the pursuer had been allowed 
to proceed to proof on the basis of the “involuntary cause” exception.
The diffi culty here is that this was not the basis upon which Salter was decided. 
33 Para 8.
34 Para 9.
35 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310 at 408 per Lord Oliver.
36 Para 8.
37 [1951] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 271. 
38 (1983) 133 NLJ 870.
39 The Times, 4 February 1986. The case is also reported very briefl y at (1986) 136 NLJ 446, but only in 
the context of quantum of damages.
40 See Dooley at 277.
41 White v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455 at 507-508.
42 At 508.
43 M Lunney and K Oliphant, Tort Law: Text and Materials (2000) 295; M A Jones, Textbook on Torts, 8th 
edn (2002) 163; P Giliker and S Beckwith, Tort (2004) 121. 
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This is clear from the following passage in Salter, where Temporary Judge Reid stated 
that:44
In my opinion, on the assumed facts, the pursuer is a primary victim because he was actively 
involved in the accident which led to the death of his fellow employee. He has averred (but 
did not need to for the purposes of establishing the existence and scope of the duties of 
care upon which he founds) that he blamed himself for the accident … It is not a necessary 
ingredient to establish the existence and scope of any duty on the part of his employers to 
take reasonable care to avoid causing him psychiatric injury that he either blamed himself 
for the accident or that he was within the range of foreseeable physical injury.
Instead, as we have already seen, Temporary Judge Reid allowed the case to proceed 
to proof on the basis that the pursuer fell within the Alcock defi nition of a primary 
victim as someone who was “an active participant in the accident”, an aspect of Salter 
that is not mentioned in Anderson, where the White defi nition is preferred.
E. THE PRIMARY/SECONDARY VICTIM DISTINCTION: 
WHERE TO NOW?
In England and Wales, opinion is divided on whether White settled the question of 
how a primary victim should be defi ned. On one hand, Stephen Todd has concluded 
that White has “remov[ed] uncertainty in the defi nition of primary victim” and that 
“the law has at least been clarifi ed”.45 Donal Nolan, however, recently described 
Alcock and Page v Smith as “rival lines of authority, which add to the complexity of 
the law”.46 In North Glamorgan NHS Trust v Walters,47 the Court of Appeal used the 
Alcock defi nition48 and in W v Essex County Council,49 Lord Slynn remarked that 
“the categorisation of those claiming to be included as primary or secondary victims is 
not as I read the cases fi nally closed. It is a concept still to be developed in different 
factual situations.”50
In Scotland, the position is no clearer and Anderson does little to clarify matters. 
Admittedly it adds to the balance of authorities which have adopted the White defi ni-
tion of a primary victim.51 But in another part of the judgment, Anderson relies heavily 
on Salter, a case where the Alcock defi nition was favoured, although this aspect of 
Salter is not mentioned anywhere in Anderson. Instead, Lord Drummond Young 
classifi es Salter, incorrectly, as a case that was decided on the basis of the “involuntary 
cause” route to primary victim status. But, as we have seen, the status of this branch 
of the law is far from certain.
44 Salter v UB Frozen and Chilled Foods Ltd 2004 SC 233 at para 27, emphasis added.
45 Todd (n 19) at 347. 
46 D Nolan, “Psychiatric injury at the crossroads” (2004) Journal of Personal Injury Law 1 at 7.
47 [2002] EWCA Civ 1792.
48 Walters at para 12 per Ward LJ.
49 [2001] 2 AC 592.
50 At 601.
51 Following Keen and Campbell, although not explicitly.
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The Scottish Law Commission has recently published a report in this area52 and 
at some point legislative reform may follow. The Commission attempts to escape the 
terminology of primary and secondary victims, recommending that the distinction be 
abolished.53 However, the Commission also recommends that those who “were not 
directly involved in an incident resulting from the defender’s wrongful conduct”54 
should only be able to recover if psychiatric injury (or, as the Commission prefers, 
“mental harm”)55 was reasonably foreseeable and the pursuer had a close relationship 
with the person who was killed and injured.56 In effect this is the adoption of something 
close to the Alcock distinction between primary and secondary victims, albeit with 
fewer restrictions placed on the claims of those who are not “directly involved”.57
One thing that Anderson does demonstrate is that the precise boundaries of the 
primary/secondary victim distinction remain unclear. The distinction has been drawn 
in the case law at least in part for policy reasons – to restrict the ambit of liability 
and thus to prevent the fl oodgates from opening.58 But fl oodgates arguments have 
been rejected by some as unconvincing in this context,59 provided that a requirement 
for the pursuer to have suffered a recognised psychiatric illness is in place. There 
may be something to be said for the suggestion that Scots law abandon the primary/
secondary victim distinction altogether and decide cases according to the normal rules 
of delictual liability – on whether or not the pursuer’s psychiatric injury was reasonably 
foreseeable.60
Fiona Leverick
University of Aberdeen
The author would like to thank James Chalmers for commenting on an earlier draft.
52 Report on Damages for Psychiatric Injury (Scot Law Com No 196, 2004).
53 Para 3.3.
54 Para 3.15, emphasis added.
55 See paras 1.8 and 3.8.
56 Paras 3.15, 3.54.
57 For critical comment, see D Nolan, “Reforming liability for psychiatric injury in Scotland: a recipe for 
uncertainty?” (2005) 68 MLR 983 at 991. 
58 Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310 at 417 per Lord Oliver; White v Chief 
Constable of South Yorkshire [1999] 2 AC 455 at 494 per Lord Steyn.
59 Nolan (n 57) at 994; M A Jones, “Liability for psychiatric illness – more principle, less subtlety?” (1995) 
4 Web Journal of Current Legal Issues.
60 Kinloch (n 28) at 262; B J Rodger, “Recovery for ‘nervous shock’” (1998) 2 EdinLR 100 at 105-107.
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